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          INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND THE WORLD GROWTH RESURGENCE∗  
                     by 
Dale W. Jorgenson and Khuong Vu 
1.  Introduction. 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the impact of investment in 
information technology (IT) equipment and software on the recent revival of 
world economic growth. The crucial role of IT investment in the growth of 
the U.S. economy has been thoroughly documented and widely discussed.
1 
Jorgenson (2001) has shown that the remarkable behavior of IT prices is the 
key to understanding of the American growth resurgence since 1995. This 
behavior can be traced to developments in semiconductor technology that are 
widely understood by technologists and economists.  
Jorgenson (2003) has shown that the growth of IT investment jumped to 
double-digit levels after 1995 in all the G7 economies – Canada, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom, as well as the United 
States.
2 These economies account for nearly half of world output and a much 
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1See Jorgenson and Kevin Stiroh (2000) and Stephen Oliner and Daniel Sichel 
(2000). The growth accounting methodology employed in this literature is 
discussed by Jorgenson, Mun Ho, and Stiroh (2005) and summarized by 
Jorgenson (2005). 
2Nadim Ahmad, Paul Schreyer, and Anita Wolfl (2004) have analyzed the impact 
of IT investment in OECD countries. Timmer, et al., (2003, 2005) and 
Francesco Daveri (2002) have presented comparisons among European economies.  
Marcin Piatkowski and van Ark (2005) have compared the impact of IT 
investment on the economies of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.    3
larger share of world IT investment. The surge of IT investment resulted 
from a sharp acceleration in the rate of decline of prices of IT equipment 
and software. Jorgenson (2001) has traced this to a drastic shortening of 
the product cycle for semiconductors from three years to two years, 
beginning in 1995.  
In Section 2 we describe the growth of the world economy, seven 
economic regions, and fourteen major economies during the period 1989-2004.
3 
The world economy is divided among the G7 and Non-G7 industrialized 
economies, Developing Asia, Latin America, Eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet Union, North Africa and the Middle East, and Sub-Saharan Africa. The 
fourteen major economies include the G7 economies listed above and the 
developing and transition economies of Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, 
Mexico, Russia, South Korea.  
We have sub-divided the period 1989-2004 into 1989-1995, 1995-2000, 
and 2000-2004 in order to focus on the response of IT investment to the 
accelerated decline in IT prices in 1995 and the impact of the dot-com crash 
of 2000. World economic growth has undergone a powerful revival since 1995. 
The per capita growth rate jumped a full percentage point from 2.72 percent 
during 1989-1995 to 3.73 percent in 1995-2000 and higher growth was 
sustained at a rate of 3.75 percent after 2000. We can underscore the 
significance of more rapid growth by pointing out that per capita growth of 
2.72 percent doubles world output by four times in a century, while 3.75 
percent doubles output more than five times per century.  
In Section 3 we allocate the growth of world output between input 
growth and productivity. Our most astonishing finding is that input growth 
greatly predominates! Productivity growth accounted for less than one-fifth 
                                                 
3We include 110 economies with more than one million in population and a 
complete set of national accounts for the period 1989-2004 from Penn World 
Table (2002) and World Bank Development Indicators Online (2006). These 
economies account for more that 96 percent of world output.    4
of the total during 1989-1995, while input growth accounted for more than 
four-fifths. Similarly, input growth contributed almost three-quarters of 
growth from 1995-2000 and more than three-fifths from 2000-2004. The only 
departure from this world-wide trend was the revival of economic growth in 
Eastern Europe after 1995, driven by a rebound from the productivity 
collapse of 1989-1995.  
In Section 3 we distribute the growth of input per capita between 
investments in human capital and tangible assets, especially IT equipment 
and software. The world economy, all seven regions, and the fourteen major 
economies experienced a surge in investment in IT after 1995. The soaring 
level of U.S. IT investment after 1995 was paralleled by jumps in IT 
investment throughout the industrialized world.  The contributions of IT 
investment in Developing Asia, Latin America, Eastern Europe, North Africa 
and the Middle East, and Sub-Saharan Africa more than doubled after 1995, 
beginning from much lower levels.  
The contribution of IT investment to growth of the G7 economies has 
moderated substantially since the dot-com crash of 2000. The IT contribution 
has slowed for the Non-G7 industrialized economies as well. However, the 
contribution of IT investment has continued to rise for Developing Asia, 
Latin America, Eastern Europe, North Africa and the Middle East, and Sub-
Saharan Africa. The contributions of Non-IT investment and labor input to 
world growth declined after the dot-com crash, but total factor productivity 
growth rose substantially, reflecting increases in all regions except North 
Africa and the Middle East.  
In Section 4 we present levels of output per capita, input per capita, 
and productivity for the world economy, the seven economic regions, and the 
fourteen major economies. We find that differences in per capita output 
levels are primarily explained by differences in per capita input, rather 
than variations in productivity. Taking U.S. output per capita in 2000 as   5
100.0, world output per capita was a relatively modest 24.9 in 2004. Using 
similar scales for input and productivity, world input per capita in 2004 
was a substantial 37.7 and world productivity a robust 66.0. Section 5 
concludes the paper.  
                   2. World Economic Growth, 1989-2004.  
In order to set the stage for analyzing the impact of IT investment on 
the growth of the world economy, we first consider the shares of world 
product and growth for the seven regions and fourteen major economies 
presented in Table 1. Following Jorgenson (2001), we have chosen GDP as a 
measure of output. We employ the Penn World Table, presented by Alan Heston, 
Robert Summers, and Bettina Aten (2002), as the primary data source on GDP 
and purchasing power parities for economies outside the G7 and the European 
Union prior to enlargement in May 2004.
4  
We have revised and updated the U.S. data presented by Jorgenson 
(2001) through 2004. Comparable data for Canada have been constructed by 
Statistics Canada.
5 Data for France, Germany, Italy, and the U.K. and the 
economies of the European Union before enlargement have been developed for 
the European Commission by Timmer, et al.
6 Finally, data for Japan have been 
assembled by Jorgenson and Motohashi for the Research Institute on Economy, 
Trade, and Industry.
7 We have linked these data by means of the OECD’s 
purchasing power parities for 2002.
8 
The G7 economies accounted for slightly under half of world product 
from 1989-1995. The per capita growth rates of these economies - 2.19 
percent before 1995, 3.25 percent from 1995-2000, and 2.20 percent during 
                                                 
4Maddison (2001) provides estimates of national product and population for 
134 countries for varying periods from 1820-1998 in his magisterial volume, 
The World Economy: A Millenial Perspective.   
5See Baldwin and Harchaoui (2003). 
6See Timmer, Ypma, and van Ark (2003, updated 2005).  
7See Jorgenson and Motohashi (2005).  
8See OECD (2005).    6
2000-2004 – lagged considerably behind world growth rates for these periods. 
The G7 shares in world growth were 39.7 percent during 1989-1995 and 41.2 
percent from 1995-2000, but only a meager 26.4 percent during 2000-2004. 
This led to a decline of four percentage points in the G7 share of world 
product from 49 percent in 1989-1995 to 45 percent during 2000-2004.  
During 1989-1995 the U.S. accounted for 22.9 percent of world product 
and 46.6 percent of G7 product. The U.S. share of G7 output rose to 47.9 
percent from 1995-2000 and 49.6 percent during 2000-2004. After 1995 Japan 
fell from its ranking as the world’s second largest economy to third largest 
after China, but remained second among the G7 economies. Germany dropped 
from fourth place before 1995, following the U.S., China, and Japan, to 
fifth place after 1995, ranking behind India as well. However, Germany 
retained its position as the leading European economy. France, Italy and the 
U.K. were considerably smaller, but similar in size. Canada was the smallest 
of the G7 economies.  
The U.S. growth rate jumped from 2.44 percent during 1989-1995 to 4.29 
percent in 1995-2000, before subsiding to 2.75 percent from 2000-2004. The 
period 2000-2004 includes the dot-com crash of 2000, the shallow U.S. 
recession of 2001, and the recovery that followed, while the period 1995-
2000 encompasses the IT-generated investment boom of the last half of the 
1990’s. The U.S. share in world growth exceeded its share in world product 
only during 1995-2000. The remaining G7 economies had lower shares of world 
growth than world product throughout the period 1989-2004.  
The 16 economies of Developing Asia generated only slightly more than 
a fifth of world output before 1995, but 24.4 percent from 1995-2000 and a 
stunning 27.3 percent after 2000! The burgeoning economies of China and 
India accounted for more than 60 percent of Asian output during 1989-1995,   7
65 percent in 1995-2000, and 68.6 percent after 2000.
9 The economies of 
Developing Asia grew at 7.54 percent before 1995, 5.91 percent from 1995-
2000, and 6.51 percent after 2000. These economies generated an astounding 
55.7 percent of world growth during the remarkable revival of 1989-1995! 
Developing Asia’s share in world growth declined to 38.7 percent during 
1995-2000, below the G7 share of 41.2 percent, but recovered to 47.5 percent 
after 2000. China alone accounted for more than a quarter of world growth 
during the period 1989-2004. 
The 15 Non-G7 industrialized economies generated 9.2 percent of world 
output during 1989-1995. However, these economies had lower shares in world 
growth than world product throughout the period 1989-2004. Their shares in 
world output dropped to nine percent during 1995-2000 and 8.7 percent after 
2000. All of the economies of Eastern Europe experienced a decline in output 
during 1989-1995 after initiating the transition from socialism to a market 
economy. Collectively, these economies reduced world growth by 17.5 percent 
during the period 1989-1995, lowering their share of world product by almost 
two percentage points from 7.5 percent during 1989-1995 to 5.5 percent in 
1995-2000 and 5.6 percent after 2000.  
During 1989-1995 the 9.2 percent share of the Latin American economies 
in world growth exceeded their 8.7 percent share in world product. Growth in 
these economies declined to 4.6 percent of world growth in 1995-2000 and 
revived modestly to 6.2 percent after 2000. Brazil and Mexico were 
responsible for about sixty percent of Latin American GDP throughout the 
period 1989-2004. However, the shares of these two major Latin American 
                                                 
9Our data for China are taken from the Penn World Table (2002). These data 
are based on Maddison (1998) rather than official Chinese estimates. 
Maddison and Alwyn Young (2003) present persuasive evidence that the 
official estimates exaggerate the growth of output and productivity in 
China. For extensive references to the debate over Chinese growth rates and 
a review of the issues, see the recent critique of Maddison by Carsten Holz 
(2006) and Maddison’s (2006) reply.    8
economies in world product fell below their growth shares, leading to 
gradual declines in their product shares from 5.3 percent in 1989-1995, to 
five percent during 1995-2000, and 4.8 percent after 2000.  
The 11 economies of North Africa and the Middle East, taken together, 
were comparable in size to France, Italy, or the U.K., while the 30 
economies of Sub-Saharan Africa, as a group, ranked with Canada. The 
economies of North Africa and the Middle East had a share in world growth of 
4.6 percent during 1989-1995, well above their 3.2 percent share in world 
product. During 1995-2000 their share in world growth fell to 3.5 percent, 
still above the corresponding share in world product of 3.3 percent.  This 
trend continued with a growth share of 3.9 percent and a product share of 
3.4 percent after 2000. Growth shares in the economies of Sub-Saharan Africa 
lagged behind their shares in world product before 2000, but the two shares 
were essentially the same after 2000.  
    3. Sources of World Economic Growth.  
In this section we allocate the sources of world economic growth among 
the contributions of capital and labor inputs and the growth of 
productivity. About 35-40 percent of world growth can be attributed to the 
accumulation and deployment of capital and another a quarter to a third to 
the more effective use of labor. We find that productivity, frequently 
described as the primary engine of economic growth, accounted for only 20-40 
percent of growth.  
We have derived estimates of capital input and property income from 
national accounting data for the G7 economies. We have constructed estimates 
of hours worked and labor compensation from labor force surveys for each of 
these economies. We measure the contribution of labor inputs, classified by 
age, sex, educational attainment, and employment status, by weighting the 
growth rate of each type of labor input by its share in the value of output. 
Finally, we employ purchasing power parities for capital and labor inputs   9
constructed by Jorgenson (2003).
10 We have extended these estimates of 
capital and labor inputs to the 103 Non-G7 countries using data sources and 
methods described in the Appendix to the electronic version of the paper.
11  
Our second objective is to explore the determinants of the growth of 
capital input, emphasizing the role of investment in information technology 
equipment and software. We have derived estimates of IT investment from 
national accounting data for the G7 and the economies of the European Union 
before enlargement. We measure the contribution of IT investment to economic 
growth by weighting the growth rate of IT capital input by its share in the 
value of output. Similarly, the contribution of Non-IT investment is a 
share-weighted growth rate of Non-IT capital input. The contribution of 
capital input is the sum of these two components.  
We have revised and updated the U.S. data presented by Jorgenson 
(2001) on investment in information technology and equipment.
12 Data on IT 
investment for Canada have been have been constructed by Statistics 
Canada.
13 Data for the countries of the European Union have been developed 
for the European Commission by Timmer, et al.
14 Finally, data for Japan have 
been assembled by Jorgenson and Motohashi.
15 We have relied on the WITSA 
                                                 
10 Purchasing power parities for inputs follow the methodology described in 
detail by Jorgenson and Eric Yip (2001).  
11We employ data on educational attainment from Robert Barro and Jong-Wha 
Lee (2001) and governance indicators constructed by Daniel Kaufmann, Aart 
Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi (2004) for the World Bank; for further details, 
see the electronic version of the paper: 
http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/jorgenson/papers/papers.html. 
12  U.S. data on investment in IT equipment and software, provided by the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), are the most comprehensive and detailed. 
The BEA data are described by Bruce Grimm, Brent Moulton, and David 
Wasshausen (2005).  
13See Baldwin and Harchaoui (2003). 
14See Timmer, Ypma, and van Ark (2003, updated 2005).  
15See Jorgenson and Motohashi (2005).    10
Digital Planet Report (2006), as the starting point for estimates of IT 
investment for the remaining economies.
16  
Our third objective is to analyze the determinants of the growth of 
labor input, focusing on the role of investment in human capital. We have 
divided labor input growth between the growth of hours worked and labor 
quality, where quality is defined as the ratio of labor input to hours 
worked. Labor quality growth captures the impact of changes in the 
composition of labor input. These arise, for example, through increases in 
the education and experience of the labor force. The contribution of labor 
input is the sum of the two components, weighted by the share of labor in 
output. Finally, productivity growth is the difference between the rate of 
growth of output and the contributions of capital and labor inputs. 
The contribution of capital input to world economic growth before 1995 
was 1.13 percent, more than 41.5 percent of the growth rate of 2.72 percent. 
Labor input contributed one percent or slightly less than 36.4 percent of 
growth, while productivity growth was 0.61 percent per year or just over 
22.4 percent of growth. During 1995-2000 the contribution of capital input 
climbed to 1.51 percent, nearly 40.5 percent of output growth of 3.73 
percent, while the contribution of labor input rose to 1.27 percent, around 
34 percent. Productivity increased to 0.96 percent per year or 25.7 percent 
of growth.  
After 2000 world growth continued at an accelerated rate of 3.75 
percent. The contribution of capital declined to 1.28 percent or 34.2 
percent of the world growth. The contribution of labor fell to 1.07 percent 
                                                 
16WITSA stands for the World Information Technology and Services Alliance. 
Other important sources of data include the International Telecommunication 
Union (ITU) telecommunications indicators, the UNDP Human Development 
reports, and the Business Software Alliance (2003). Additional details are 
given in the Appendix to the electronic version of this paper: 
http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/jorgenson/papers/papers.html. 
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or 28.5 percent of growth. More rapid growth was maintained by a jump in 
productivity growth to 1.4 percent per year or 37.3 percent of the growth of 
output. We arrive at the astonishing conclusion that the contributions of 
capital and labor inputs greatly predominate over productivity as sources of 
world economic growth throughout the period 1989-2004!  
We have divided the contribution of capital input to world economic 
growth between IT equipment and software and Non-IT capital input. The 
contribution of IT almost doubled after 1995 from less than a quarter of the 
contribution of capital input during 1989-1995 to well over a third from 
1995-2000. The share of IT in the contribution of capital input receded to 
slightly less than a third after the dot-com crash of 2000. However, it is 
important to emphasize that the contribution of Non-IT investment was more 
important throughout the period 1989-2004.  
We have divided the contribution of labor input between hours worked 
and labor quality. Hours worked was the major source of the contribution of 
labor input to economic growth throughout the period 1989-2004. The 
contribution of hours rose from 0.53 percent before 1995 to 0.92 percent 
during 1995-2000, but fell back to 0.70 percent after 2000. The contribution 
of labor quality declined steadily from 0.45 percent before 1995 to 0.34 
percent during 1995-2000 and to 0.37 percent after 2000.  
  After 1995 world economic growth jumped by a full percentage point. 
The contribution of capital explained 0.38 percent of this acceleration, 
while productivity growth accounted for 0.35 percent, and labor contributed 
0.28 percent. The jump in IT investment of 0.29 percent was by far the most 
important source of the increase in capital. This can be traced to the more 
rapid rate of decline of IT prices after 1995 analyzed by Jorgenson (2001). 
The substantial increase of 0.39 percent in the contribution of hours worked 
offset the decline in the contribution of labor quality.   12
Table 2 presents the contribution of capital input to economic growth 
for the G7 economies, divided between IT and Non-IT. Capital input was the 
most important source of growth before and after 1995. The contribution of 
capital input before 1995 was 1.28 or almost three-fifths of the G7 growth 
rate of 2.19 percent. The capital contribution of 1.69 percent from 1995-
2000 was 52 percent of the higher growth rate of 3.25 percent. After 2000 
the capital contribution fell to 1.05 percent or 47.7 percent of the 
substantially lower G7 growth rate of 2.20 percent. 
Labor input growth contributed 0.50 percent to growth of the G7 
economies before 1995, 0.87 percent in 1995-2000, but only 0.36 percent 
after 2000. Hours worked predominated during 1995-2000, growing at 0.63 
percent, while labor quality rose at 0.24 percent. Growth in hours was only 
0.07 percent before 1995 and 0.28 percent after 2000, while labor quality 
growth was 0.43 percent and 0.17 percent, respectively. Productivity 
accounted for 0.42 percent before 1995, 0.69 percent during 1995-2000, and 
0.79 percent after 2000. Productivity ranged from less than 20 percent 
before 1995 to 36 percent after 2000.  
The powerful surge of IT investment in the U.S. after 1995 is mirrored 
in jumps in the growth rates of IT capital through the G7. The contribution 
of IT capital input for the G7 more than doubled from 0.39 during the period 
1989-1995 to 0.82 percent during 1995-2004, before receding to 0.47 percent 
after 2000. The contribution of Non-IT capital input predominated in all 
three sub-periods, but fell steadily throughout 1989-2004. This reflected 
more rapid substitution of IT capital input for Non-IT capital input in 
response to swiftly declining prices of IT equipment and software after 
1995.  
In Developing Asia the contribution of capital input increased from 
1.81 percent before 1995 to 2.22 percent in 1995-2000 and rose again to 2.27 
percent after 2000. The contribution of labor input fell from 2.33 percent   13
during 1989-1995 to 1.64 percent during 1995-2000 and recovered slightly to 
1.68 percent after 2000. The significant slowdown in the Asian growth rate 
from 7.54 percent before 1995 to 5.91 percent during 1995-2000 can be traced 
almost entirely to a sharp decline in productivity growth from 3.41 to 2.04 
percent. Similarly, the modest revival of growth to 6.51 percent can be 
attributed to higher productivity growth of 2.57 percent. Productivity 
explained slightly over 45 percent of Asian growth before 1995, less than 35 
percent in 1995-2000, and around 40 percent after 2000.   
The first half of the 1990’s was a continuation of the Asian Miracle, 
analyzed by Paul Krugman (1994), Lawrence Lau (1999), and Young (1995). This 
period was dominated by the spectacular rise of China and India and the 
continuing emergence of the Gang of Four – Hong Kong, Singapore, South 
Korea, and Taiwan. However, all Asian economies, except The Philippines,  
had growth rates in excess of the world average of 2.72 percent. The second 
half of the 1990’s was dominated by the Asian financial crisis but, 
surprisingly, conforms much more closely to the “Krugman thesis” attributing 
Asian growth to input growth rather than productivity.  
The “Krugman thesis” was originally propounded to distinguish the 
Asian Miracle from growth in industrialized countries. According to this 
thesis, Asian growth was differentiated by high growth rates and a great 
predominance of inputs over productivity as the sources of growth. In fact, 
the peak of productivity growth in Developing Asia, absolutely and 
relatively, was during the Asian Miracle of the early 1990’s! Moreover, 
growth in the world economy and the G7 economies was dominated by growth of 
capital and labor inputs, not productivity.  
Developing Asia experienced a steady increase in the contribution of 
investment in IT equipment and software to economic growth. The contribution 
of IT investment more than doubled from 0.14 percent before 1995 to 0.33 
during 1995-2000. The contribution of IT investment increased to 0.44   14
percent after 2000. The rush in IT investment was particularly powerful in 
China, rising from 0.17 percent before 1995 to 0.48 percent during 1995-2000 
and increasing again to 0.63 percent after 2000. India lagged substantially 
behind China and the rest of Developing Asia as well.  
Indonesia was the only major economy to experience a decline in the 
contribution of both IT and Non-IT investment during 1995-2000, the period 
of the Asian financial crisis. Indonesia’s IT investment recovered slightly 
after 2000, but Non-IT investment continued to slump. South Korea’s IT 
investment increased from 0.21 before 1995 to 0.34 in 1995-2000 and 0.39 
after 2000, while Non-IT investment dropped as a consequence of the 
financial crisis. The contribution of Non-IT investment in Asia greatly 
predominated throughout the period 1989-2004 and the contribution of hours 
worked outweighed labor quality as a source of growth in labor input.  
The pattern of economic growth in the fifteen Non-G7 industrialized 
economies was similar to G7 growth before 2000 with a sharp acceleration 
after 1995. However, the Non-G7 economies maintained rapid growth after 
2000, while the G7 economies reverted to pre-1995 growth rates. The 
contribution of labor input predominated over capital input throughout the 
period 1989-2004. Non-G7 productivity growth fell from 0.85 percent before 
1995 to 0.23 percent in 1995-2000, before rebounding to 0.37 percent after 
2000. Productivity accounted for more than 40 percent of growth before 1995, 
but less than eight percent from 1995-2000 and less than 13 percent after 
2000.  
The impact of investment in IT equipment and software in the Non-G7 
economies doubled from 0.14 percent before 1995 to 0.31 percent during 1995-
2000, before falling back to 0.27 percent after 2000. This provided a 
substantial impetus to the acceleration in Non-G7 growth rates in the face 
of sharply declining productivity growth. Non-IT investment explained an 
important part of the growth acceleration. However, the increased   15
contribution of hours worked from 0.40 percent before 1995 to 1.60 in 1995-
2000 and 1.48 percent after 2000 greatly predominated. 
  The collapse of economic growth in Eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet Union during 1989-1995 can be attributed to a steep decline in 
productivity during the initial transition from socialism. This was followed 
by a modest revival in both economic growth and productivity growth from 
1995-2000, bringing many of the transition economies back to 1989 levels of 
output per capita. The contribution of capital input declined throughout the 
period 1989-2004, even as the contribution of IT investment jumped from 0.09 
percent before 1995 to 0.23 percent in 1995-2000 and 0.31 percent after 
2000. Hour worked declined sharply during 1989-1995 and continued to fall 
after 1995, but labor quality improved substantially.  
Latin America’s growth decelerated slightly after 1995, falling from 
2.92 to 2.02 percent in 1995-2000, before recovering to 2.94 percent after 
2000. The contribution of labor input was 1.77 percent before 1995, 1.70 
from 1995-2000 and 1.82 percent after 2000, accounting for the lion’s share 
of regional growth. The contribution of capital input shifted toward IT, but 
remained relatively weak. Nonetheless, the contribution of IT investment in 
Latin America more than doubled, jumping from 0.14 percent before 1995 to 
0.29 percent in 1995-2000 and 0.30 after 2000. Productivity collapsed after 
1995, falling to a negative 0.62 percent in 1995-2000, before recovering to 
0.25 percent after 2000.  
Productivity in Sub-Saharan Africa collapsed during 1989-1995, running 
at -1.62 percent, before recovering to 0.24 percent in 1995-2000 and rising 
sharply to 0.88 percent after 2000. As in Latin America, the contribution of 
labor input predominated throughout the period 1989-2004. Productivity in 
North Africa and the Middle East dropped from 0.51 percent before 1995 to 
0.37 percent in 1995-2000 and 0.34 percent after 2000. In Sub-Saharan Africa   16
and North Africa and the Middle East, growth of capital and labor inputs 
greatly predominated over productivity as a source of economic growth. 
      4. World Output, Input, and Productivity. 
The final step in analyzing the world growth resurgence is to 
characterize the evolution of levels of output, input, and productivity for 
the world economy, the seven economic regions, and the fourteen major 
economies. In Table 3 we present levels of output per capita when the 
transition from socialism began in 1989, at the start of the worldwide IT 
investment boom in 1995, at the beginning of the dot-com crash in 2000, and 
at the end of the period covered by our study in 2004. We also present input 
per capita and productivity for these years, where productivity is defined 
as the ratio of output to input.  
Differences in per capita output levels are mainly due to differences 
in per capita input, rather than disparities in productivity. Taking U.S. 
output per capita in 2000 as 100.0, world output per capita was a relatively 
modest 18.6 in 1989. Using similar scales for input and productivity, world 
input per capita in 1989 was a considerable 30.5 and world productivity a 
very substantial 61.0. The level of world output advanced to 19.9 in 1995, 
jumped to 22.4 in 2000, and leapt again to 24.9 in 2004, reflecting 
impressive progress in mobilizing world inputs. World productivity edged 
upward modestly to 61.2 in 1995, bounded to 63.5 in 2000 and then rose again 
to 66.0 in 2004.  
It is not surprising that world productivity is much closer to U.S. 
levels than world input per capita. As globalization has proceeded, 
technologies have been transferred with relative ease from industrialized 
economies to the developing world. Mobilization of inputs in developing 
economies has been remarkable, but has required far more time and effort.  
Institutional barriers to accumulation of human and non-human capital must 
be overcome and networks among the co-operating activities must be   17
established and enhanced. Obsolete methods for organizing production must be 
displaced by up-to-date techniques that employ information technology 
equipment and software. 
The output gap between the U.S. and the other G7 economies has widened 
since the American growth resurgence began in 1995. The G7 economies led the 
seven economic regions in output per capita, input per capita, and 
productivity throughout the period 1989-2004. Output per capita in the G7 
was, nonetheless, well below U.S. levels. Taking U.S. output per capita in 
2000 as 100.0, G7 output per capita was 67.2 in 1989, 73.3 in 1995, 83.3 in 
2000, and 89.0 in 2004. By comparison U.S. output per capita was 79.6, 85.6, 
100.0, and 107.1 in these years. 
Canada was very close to the U.S. in output per capita in 1989, but 
fell substantially behind by 1995. The U.S.-Canada gap widened further 
during the last half of the 1990’s, despite impressive gains in Canada. 
Germany, Japan, Italy, and the U.K. had similar levels of output per capita 
throughout 1989-2004, but remained considerably behind the two North 
American economies. France lagged the rest of the G7 in output per capita in 
1989 and failed to gain ground during the period 1989-2004.  
The U.S. was the leader among the G7 economies in input per capita 
throughout the period 1989-2004. Taking the U.S. as 100.0 in 2000, G7 input 
per capita was 76.4 in 1989, 81.2 in 1995, 89.0 in 2000, and 92.0 in 2004, 
while U.S. input per capita was 84.5, 89.2, 100.0, and 102.5 in these years. 
Canada, Germany, and Japan were closest to U.S. levels of input per capita 
with Germany ranking second from 1989-2000 and Canada ranking second in 
2004. Italy lagged behind the rest of the G7 in input per capita from 1989-
2000, surpassing only France in 2004. The U.K. made substantial progress 
toward achieving input levels comparable to those of Germany and Japan.  
Productivity in the G7 has remained close to U.S. levels, rising from 
88.0 in 1989 to 90.2 in 1995, and 93.6 in 2000, and 96.8 in 2004 with the   18
U.S. equal to 100.0 in 2000. Canada was the productivity leader throughout 
the period 1989-2004 with the U.S. in second place, but rapidly closing the 
gap after 2000. Japan made substantial gains in productivity, overtaking 
Germany in 2000, but lagged behind the other members of the G7.  
Differences among the G7 economies in output per capita can be 
explained by both differences in input per capita and productivity gaps. 
For example, the range in output in 2004 was from 69.9 for Italy to 107.1 
for the U.S., while the range in input was from 76.5 for France to 102.5 for 
the U.S. Productivity varied from 81.7 for Germany to 105.1 for Canada. 
In the economies of Developing Asia output per capita rose 
spectacularly from 5.8 in 1989 to 8.2 in 1995, 10.3 in 2000, and 12.7 in 
2004 with the U.S. equal to 100.0 in 2000. Levels of output per capita in 
Asia’s largest economies, China and India, remained at 15.3 and 8.5, 
respectively, in 2004. These vast shortfalls in output per capita, relative 
to the industrialized economies, are due primarily to differences in input 
per capita, rather than productivity gaps. Developing Asia’s levels of input 
per capita were 20.2 in 1989, 23.5 in 1995, 26.7 in 2000, and 29.8 in 2004, 
while Asian productivity levels were 28.7, 34.8, 38.5, and 42.5, 
respectively.  
China made extraordinary gains in output per capita, growing from 4.7  
in 1989 to 8.0 in 1995, 11.3 in 2000, and 15.3 in 2004 with the U.S. equal 
to 100.0 in 2000. India had essentially the same output per capita as China 
in 1989, but grew less impressively to only 5.8 in 1995, 7.1 in 2000, and 
8.5 in 2004. China’s input per capita exceeded India’s throughout the 
period, rising to 35.8 in 2004 by comparison with India’s 23.1 in the same 
year. India’s productivity level of 26.4 in 1989 considerably exceeded 
China’s 23.6 in that year. China’s productivity rose to 30.9 in 1995, 
outstripping India’s 30.3. China extended its lead over India in 2000 and by   19
2004 had attained a productivity level of 42.7 by comparison with India’s 
36.7. 
Indonesia grew impressively from 1989 to 1995, but failed to recover 
from the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990’s. Nonetheless, Indonesia 
maintained its lead over India in output per capita, but dropped behind 
China in 2000. Indonesia led India in input per capita throughout the period 
1989-2004, but fell behind China in 1995. Indonesia’s productivity level was 
ahead of both China and India in 1995, but fell behind both economies by 
2000. South Korea made substantial gains in input per capita, surpassing 
France and approaching Italy, while falling considerably short of Japan and 
Germany. However, Korean productivity levels remained well below those of 
the G7 economies.  
  The 15 Non-G7 industrialized economies, taken together, had levels of 
output per capita, input per capita, and productivity comparable to the U.K. 
during period 1989-2004. Before the beginning of the transition from 
socialism in 1989, output per capita in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
Union was 29.0, well above the world economy level of 18.6, with the U.S. 
equal to 100.0 in 2000. The economic collapse that accompanied the 
transition reduced output per capita to 19.7 by 1995, slightly below the 
world economy level of 19.9. A mild recovery between 1995 and 2000 brought 
the region back to 22.5, well below the level of 1989 and only slightly 
above the world economy average of 22.4.  
Input in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union shrank from 39.2 
in 1989 to 36.3 in 1995 and then remained stagnant at 35.7 in 2000 and 36.5 
in 2004. Productivity collapsed along with output per capita, declining from 
74.0 in 1989 to 54.4 in 1995, before climbing back to 63.0 in 2000 and, 
finally, surpassing the 1989 level at 76.2 in 2004. We conclude that the 
transition from socialism failed to restore the region to pre-transition   20
levels of output and input per capita by 2004, while productivity was only 
slightly higher than before the transition.  
The downturn in output per capita and productivity was especially 
severe in the economies of the former Soviet Union. Russia’s level of output 
per capita fell from 32.8 in 1989 to 19.8 in 1995, before recovering feebly 
to 21.7 in 2000 and more sharply to 28.3 in 2004. Russian input per capita 
declined after 1989, but then remained essentially unchanged throughout the 
period 1995-2004. Russian productivity mirrored the decline and subsequent 
recovery in output, falling precipitously from a level of 81.6 in 1989, 
comparable to that of Germany and Japan, to 52.6 in 1995. Russian 
productivity recovered to 60.3 in 2000 and jumped to 77.5 in 2004, but 
remained below the 1989 level.  
  For the Latin American region output per capita rose from 19.4 to 22.6 
during 1989-2004, input per capita rose from 28.2 to 32.7, but productivity 
was essentially unchanged throughout the period at about two-thirds of the 
U.S. level in 2000. The stall in productivity from 1989 to 2004 was 
pervasive, contrasting sharply with the rise in productivity in the G7 
economies, the Non-G7 industrialized economies, and Developing Asia. 
Nonetheless, Latin America’s lagging output per capita was due chiefly to 
insufficient input per capita, rather than a shortfall in productivity. 
Brazil’s economic performance has been anemic at best and has acted as 
a drag on the growth of Latin America and the world economy. Despite 
productivity levels comparable to the rest of Latin America, Brazil was 
unable to generate substantial growth in input per capita. Mexico lost 
ground in productivity between 1989 and 2004, but made steady gains in input 
per capita and expanded output per capita substantially after 1995.  
Output and input per capita in Sub-Sahara Africa was the lowest in the 
world throughout the period 1989-2004, but the level of productivity was 
slightly higher than that of Developing Asia until 2000. All the economies   21
of North Africa and the Middle East fell short of world average levels of 
output and input per capita. Output per capita grew slowly but steadily for 
the region as a whole during 1989-2004, powered by impressive gains in input 
per capita and productivity.  
5. Summary and Conclusions. 
World economic growth, led by the industrialized economies and 
Developing Asia, experienced a strong resurgence after 1995. Developing Asia 
accounted for almost half of world economic growth during 1989-2004 but 
remained well below the world average in output per capita. Sub-Saharan 
Africa and North Africa and the Middle East also languished below the world 
average. Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union lost enormous ground 
during the transition from socialism and have yet to recover completely. 
Growth trends apparent in the U.S. have counterparts throughout the 
world. Investment in tangible assets, including IT equipment and software, 
was the most important source of growth. However, Non-IT investment 
predominated. The contribution of labor input was next in magnitude with 
hours worked outweighing labor quality. Finally, productivity was the 
dominant source of growth only in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union 
during the recovery from the output and productivity collapse of 1989-1995 
that accompanied the beginning of the transition from socialism to a market 
economy.  
The leading role of IT investment in the acceleration of growth in the 
G7 economies is especially pronounced in the U.S. The contribution of labor 
input predominated in the Non-G7 industrialized economies, as well as Latin 
America, Eastern Europe, Sub-Saharan Africa, and North Africa and the Middle 
East. Productivity growth was an important source of growth in Developing 
Asia during the Asian Miracle before 1995, but growth of capital and labor 
inputs rose in importance after 1995, contrary to the “Krugman thesis”.   22
Productivity has been stagnant or declining in Latin America, Eastern 
Europe, Sub-Saharan Africa, and North Africa and the Middle East. 
All seven regions of the world economy experienced a surge in 
investment in IT equipment and software after 1995.  The impact of IT 
investment on economic growth was most striking in the G7 economies. The 
rush in IT investment was especially conspicuous in the U.S., but jumps in 
the contribution of IT capital input in Canada, Japan, and the U.K. were 
only slightly lower. France, Germany, and Italy also experienced a surge in 
IT investment, but lagged considerably behind the leaders. IT investment 
subsided among the G7 economies after the dot-com crash of 2000, while the 
contribution of Non-IT investment varied considerably and explains important 
differences among growth rates of the G7 economies.  
The surge in investment in IT equipment and software is a global 
phenomenon, but the variation in the contribution of this investment has 
grown considerably since 1995. The moderation in IT investment in the 
industrialized countries after the dot-com crash of 2000 was accompanied by 
continued expansion in the contribution of IT in the developing world, 
especially in Asia. The contribution of IT investment more than doubled 
after 1995 in Developing Asia, Latin America, Eastern Europe, and North 
Africa and the Middle East, and Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Finally, despite spectacular growth rates in Developing Asia, levels 
of output per capita remain below world averages. Differences in per capita 
output levels are mainly due to input per capita rather than productivity. 
This reflects the fact that technology is relatively easy to transfer from 
industrialized economies to developing economies, while mobilization of 
capital and labor inputs requires much more time and considerably greater 
effort. Outmoded techniques of production must give way to newer methods 
that incorporate the latest technologies, especially those that utilize 
information technology equipment and software.   23
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